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KUHN v. CARLIN

appellant should choose to stay out of Maryland "the Maryland courts will of course have no jurisdiction over it".
It is a matter of some probability, because of numerous
use tax statutes4" and divers tax situations created by
nuances of business practice, that Miller Brothers v. Maryland will not be the last case of its type to come under the
deliberation of the Court."' Also, with the sudden and
lamented death of Justice Jackson, his successor will swing
the balance of power as to whether the Miller case continues long to be the law as to its very facts or others
closely analogous to them. However, that may be resolved,
the question in each future case would seem to be one of
how much contact with the state by an out-of-state vendor
is sufficient to support the State's making him its tax collector. Realistically considered, if a State may subject a
non-resident individual or corporation to suit in the courts
of that State on causes of action arising out of single acts
done within the State, or contracts made within the State,"
it might be considered just as reasonable to require a nonresident individual or corporation to collect a use tax related to any use that grew out of any activity done in the
State by the non-resident individual or corporation. Lacking any such contact with the State as to the use which is
taxed, the foreign corporation, or non-resident individual
might validly expect constitutional exemption from the
taxing State's jurisdiction.
AMUSEMENT PARKS

-

LIABILITY OF OWNER FOR

INJURY ON CONCESSIONAIRE'S DEVICE
Kuhn v. Carlin'
Suit was entered in the Court of Common Pleas by the
Plaintiff, Kuhn, to recover from the Defendant, Carlin,
owner and operator of an amusement park, for personal injuries when a fitting on an amusement device broke. The
"There were thirty states with use tax statutes on October 5, 1953.
CCH ALL STATES SALEs TAX REPORTER (1953), 601, et seq.

" The Arkansas Supreme Court on May 24, 1954, gave prompt but restricted application to the Miller case in deciding five cases by one opinion
finding the Supreme Court rule applicable to two situations but inapplicable
to the other three, where solicitation in the State by a salesman or maintenance of a salesroom there were held sufficient to support the collector's
liability; Thompson v. Rhodes-Jennings Furn. Co., 268 S. W. 2d 376 (Mo.,
1954).
"See n. 39, supra.
1196 Md. 318, 76 A. 2d 345 (1950).
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machine was owned and operated by a concessionaire to
whom the defendant leased space and over whom the defendant exercised no direction or control. The defendant
received from the plaintiff no admission fee for entry into
the park, nor did he receive any money for the operation
of the device other than rent for the land upon which it
was located. From a judgment N.O.V. for the defendant,
after a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the plaintiff appeals.
Held. Affirmed.
The owner or operator of a place of amusement is liable
to the public for personal injuries sustained from defective
equipment maintained by a concessionaire or independent
contractor thereon, if a reasonable inspection of such equipment would have disclosed its defective character. The
owner or proprietor is under a positive obligation to know
that the place is safe and his lack of knowledge of defective
conditions which he could have discovered by a reasonable
inspection will not excuse him.' However, in the present
case, the court affirmed the judgment N.O.V. in favor of the
Defendant, Carlin, on the grounds that there was no evidence that a reasonably attentive inspection would have
disclosed that the machine was being improperly maintained.
The general rule is established by the great weight of
authority3 and by the Restatement of Torts,4 on the theory
that the operator of a place of amusement extends an invitation to the public to attend the place of amusement,
and as the author of the invitation, the patrons are his invitees and as such he owes them a non-delegable duty to
see that the premises are in a reasonably safe condition.
Since the duty of the amusement park proprietor is
based solely on his invitation to the public, the proprietor's
Rubin & Cherry Shows, Inc. v. Dinsmore, 89 Ind. App. 616, 164 N. E.
304 (1928).
For a collection of cases, see 145 A. L. R. 962.
'RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1934), Vol. II, Sec. 415.
"A possessor of land who In the course of his business holds it open
to members of the public, Is subject to liability for bodily harm caused
to them, on a part of the land retained In his possession or upon a part
thereof leased to a concessionaire, by his failure to exercise reasonable
care to secure the use of reasonably safe equipment and methods by
(b) independent contractor or concessionaire employed or peran ...
mitted to carry on upon the land an activity in furtherance of the possessor's business use thereof."
I11ustration 4. "A, the proprietor of an amusement park lets out to
B, a concessionaire, the privilege of operating a roller coaster. The
roller coaster Is improperly maintained, as a reasonably attentive Inspection would have disclosed to A. Due to the improper maintenance,
the roller coaster collapses, causing harm to C who is riding in one of
the cars. A Is liable to C."
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liability has been extended by the courts to all cases where
such an invitation, express or implied, is found to have
existed, regardless of the fact that the proprietor may not
have had a direct hand in the construction or maintenance
of the amusement device. 5 The fact that the proprietor
receives no direct pecuniary benefit from the operation of
the devices or that he receives no admission fee for entrance to the park does not act to relieve him from the
duty to inspect the devices erected by independent contractors or concessionaires. 6 Formerly some courts made a
distinction between concessionaires and independent contractors, thus relieving the amusement park proprietor
from liability if the faulty equipment was erected on land
leased to the concessionaire, but holding him liable if the
injury resulted from equipment of an independent contractor. The distinction is thought to be due to an erroneous
application of the rule that a landlord is not responsible for
tortious acts committed by the tenant upon the leased
grounds without the landlord's consent. In holding that
there is no reason for a distinction between a case where
the defective equipment was erected on land leased to a
concessionaire and where the equipment was run by an independent contractor for a percentage of the gross.receipts,
the Maine court, in Thornton v. Maine State Agricultural
Society,7 said:
"Some of the cases cited are those where the injuries resulted from the negligence of independent contractors, and not lessees. But we can perceive no tenable distinction in a case like this. In either case the
offending thing is where it is by the license and permission of the owners of the premises, and upon ground
which the owners, by virtue of their invitation to the
public, hold out as safe. This is the ground of their
liability. By inviting patrons to their fair, they make
themselves bound to use reasonable care to see that
the fair in all its parts is safe, and is conducted safely,
whether the various parts of the fair are conducted
and managed by the owners themselves, or, with their
permission, by licensees, independent contractors, or
lessees."
5 Texas State Fair v. Brittain, 118 F. 713 (5th Cir., 1902).
0 Demarest v. Palisades Realty & Amusement Co., 101 N. J. L. 66, 127
A. 536 (1925) ; Blakeley v. White Star Line, 154 Mich. 635, 118 N. W. 482

(1908).

'97 Me. 108, 53 A. 979, 982 (1902).
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Furthermore, no distinction should be drawn on the basis
of the charging of an admission fee for entry into the park;
the touchstone is the invitation of the park operator.
"It makes no difference whether admission was
charged to the grounds or not. The amusement park
was conducted as an attraction to its patrons by the
railway company, in order to hold and increase its
traffic. The plaintiff was there by the invitation of the
defendant. One who invites others to come upon his
premises for business or pleasure must exercise reasonable care to have and keep the premises reasonably
safe for such visitors."'
This rule should not be confused with the formula9 imposing liability on a lessor of land who knowingly leases it
for purposes involving the admission of the public and
upon which there is a defect existing when the lessee takes
possession. There, the liability is not, under the better view
as expressed by Cardozo, J., in Junkermann v. Tilyou
Realty Co.,10 based on the lessor's invitation to the general
public but, rather, is based on the idea that the lessor of
land has a duty to the public so great, that when he knowingly leases land which will be used for the admission of
the general public and upon which, at the time of the leasing, there is in actual existence a defect in the land that
could have been found by reasonable inspection before
transferring possession, he will not be permitted thereby
to shift this duty to the tenant who may be in a worse
pecuniary position than the lessor. Thus, under this latter
rule, the liability is extended only to the lessor who transfers possession to a lessee of land upon which a defect exists
at the time it is transferred to the lessee's possession.
However, in the cases under the rule presently discussed, since the basis of liability is the amusement park
owner's invitation, liability for injuries sustained by defects
extends to anyone in general control of the place of amusement as a whole. This liability exists not only if he owns
the land himself and in turn leases portions of it to concessionaires, but also if the proprietor of the amusement
park, himself, leases the grounds from the owner and in
turn, leases portions of it to concessionaires or to independent contractors. Here, the proprietor's liability is also
I Turgeon

v. Connecticut Co., 84 Conn. 538, 80 A. 714, 715 (1911).
'RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra, n. 4, Vol. II, Sec. 359; Albert v. State,
66 Md. 325, 7 A. 697 (1887).
213 N. Y. 404, 108 N. E. 190 (1915).
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extended beyond defective conditions existing on the land
at the time the concessionaire takes possession, and is held
to include defective conditions that arise both on the land
and in the apparatus that has been erected upon the land
after the concessionaire or independent contractor has
taken possession.
In Frear v. Manchester Traction, Light & Power Co., 1
the New Hampshire Court extended the invitation concept
to its logical conclusion. In this case, the owner of the
amusement park grounds leased out the premises as a whole
to the defendant, a railway company, who advertised the
premises as an amusement park. The owner thereafter
leased out a small portion of the same premises to Williams,
with permission to erect and operate a ferris wheel thereon.
Thus, the only relationship existing between Williams and
the defendant was that they were both lessees of the owner
of the amusement park premises. Plaintiff, a patron of
the amusement park, was injured due to a defect in the
ferris wheel, and the defendant was held liable for such
injuries sustained. Here, there was no basis of liability to
the defendant other than the invitation the defendant extended to the public through his advertisement of the
amusement park. The court found this sufficient and held
defendant liable solely on the invitation doctrine. In its
opinion, the court said:
"Surrender of control of the premises to Williams
did not free the railway from responsibility. The issue
is not one of a landlord's liability to his tenants' guests,
but of his duty to his own invitees. The doctrine of
nonliability for the negligence of an independent contractor, or a lessee, does not control the rights and
duties of these parties. A duty was imposed, not because the railway was liable generally for faulty construction or negligent operation, but because its acts
made it a sponsor for the enterprise. The invitation
was such an adoption of the place invited to that the
duty to use care arose. The same duty would exist as
1183 N. H. 64, 139 A. 86, 89 (1927). In Babicz v. Riverview Sharpshooters
Park Co., 256 Ill.
24, 99 N. E. 860 (1921), concessionaires of an aninsement
park needed more land for their exhibits. Defendant, the owner of the park,
arranged for them to lease directly from the owner of an adjoining tract
the necessary land, and extended the fence surrounding ,the park to include
the additional land. The Court held for the plaintiff, who was injured by
the collapse of the grandstand built by a concessionaire on this additional
land, stating that since the plot was enclosed by the defendant park owner
within the park grounds, 'and since he used this plot in the same manner
as his own grounds, the defendant's invitation to the public extended to
that portion of the adjoining land fenced in with his own.
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to premises owned and controlled by an entire stranger,
if the defendant had in like manner invited the public
thereto as to its own property. Ownership or control
of property is often of importance as tending to show
what the invitation was. But, when the fact of invitation is otherwise shown, this feature of the situation is
not controlling."
"... . If the invitation includes a representation of
ownership or control, justice and reason require that
the invitor may be taken at his word .... If he wished
to avoid such responsibility, he should not extend such
an invitation."
The Court of Appeals in the present case specifically
distinguished the following cases which were cited by the
plaintiff, on the ground that they were not factually similar.
In Agricultural and Mechanical Association v. Gray, 2 the
proprietor was held liable for an injury caused by the
faulty construction of a grandstand. However, here, the
defendant had itself erected the grandstand which had
8 and Carlin v. Smith, 4
broken. In Lawson v. Clawson"
the
parties held were found to be proprietors of the defective
apparatus, thus liability rested upon that fact. In the instant case, Carlin, the defendant, had neither erected the
machine nor had any hand in maintaining or operating it.
Carlin v. Krout and Smith v. Benick 16 cited by the
court were also found to be distinguishable. In the Krout
case, the device (known as the "Ocean Wave") was not
only owned and operated by the defendant, but in addition
the injuries were due to "visible conditions presenting
known hazards which were voluntarily assumed" and were
not received from a defect in the apparatus, so recovery
was denied. In the Benick case, the injuries of the spectator
were not derived from a defect in the apparatus, but rather
from the personal negligence of an independent contractor
conducting an enterprise not likely in itself to cause injury
to the spectator.
- 118 Md. 600, 85 A. 291 (1912).
177 Md. 333,9 A. 2d 755 (1939).
- 148 Md. 524, 130 A. 340 (1925).
I 142 Md. 140, 143, 120 A. 232 (1923).
-87 Md. 610, 41 A. 56 (1898). This case is cited in 145 A. L. R. at 972-3
as standing for the proposition that:
. . . where the operator of a place of amusement has exercised
ordinary care in making the premises reasonably safe for his patrons,
he cannot be held liable for personal acts of negligence on the part of a
concessionaire or the latter's employees in the operation of devices used
in connection with the concession."
There is a conflict in authority in the United States on this question.
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The Court of Appeals, thus finding an absence of prior
Maryland authority determinative of the specific question,
pointed out that plaintiff relied on the rule set forth in the
Restatement of Torts, 7 but that the condition for recovery
under that rule had not been met because the plaintiff
failed to show any defect in the apparatus that could have
been discovered by a reasonable inspection. From the
standpoint of predicting for the future, the opinion does
not indicate whether the court would have permitted the
plaintiff to recover had such evidence of a discoverable
defect been shown. The Restatement rule would seem to
place an affirmative duty upon an amusement park proprietor to inspect amusement devices, even though they
are in the complete control of independent contractors and
concessionaires, but the result of the instant case did not
require flat approval of the rule. The door may be open
for its acceptance in some future case as the test of liability
of the proprietor, but a more firm pronouncement than
exists here would be required before potential plaintiffs
can accept it with assurance as being established law in
Maryland.
27

Op. cit., supra, n. 4.

